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Preamble 
  
The exchange below concerns Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan’s article ‘Systemic 
Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism’ (2010). The first paper, by Andrew 
Kliman, was posted on February 6, 2011 on the website of the Marxist-Humanist Initiative. 
The second paper is a rejoinder by Bichler and Nitzan. 
 
Value and Crisis: Bichler & Nitzan versus Marx  
Andrew Kliman, February 6, 2011   
 
This article responds to recent works by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, influential 
radical political-economic thinkers who teach, respectively, at York University in Toronto 
and at colleges in Israel. Part I, below, responds to Bichler and Nitzan’s (B&N) ‘Systemic 
Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2010). In this 
paper, they argue that (1) ‘systemic fear’ – fear of the death of the capitalism – has gripped 
capitalists during the last decade, but (2) capitalists’ belief that their system is eternal is 
necessary for its continued existence. So (3) the alleged systemic fear is itself a threat to the 
system. And thus we have yet another version of the notion that capital itself may be the 
historical Subject that will bring it down. 
B&N claim that fear of the system’s death has gripped capitalists only during two periods 
in recent history – the Great Depression and the 2000s. Their evidence for this claim consists 
entirely of the alleged fact that these two periods of crisis were the only periods since World 
War I in which equity (stock) prices and current profits were strongly correlated, i.e. the only 
periods in which they closely moved up and down together.1 However, using the exact same 
methods and the exact same data as B&N, I show below that that equity prices and current 
profits were also strongly correlated from the early 1950s through 1973 – during the so-
called golden age of capitalism!  
In Parts II and III of this article, which will appear here later this month, I will respond to 
the critique of Marx’s value theory that pervades Nitzan and Bichler’s 2009 book, Capital as 
Power. In this book, they allege that Marx’s value theory is practically useless for the study of 
accumulation. So my response will show, among other things, that his theory sheds 
                                                 
1 They interpret a strong influence of current profits on share prices as evidence that investors are acting 
on the basis of the current situation, having abandoned their supposedly normal ‘conviction’ that the 
shares will yield returns ad infinitum because capitalism is eternal. 
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significant light on the long decline in the rate of accumulation (investment) that contributed 
to ever-increasing debt burdens in the U.S. and helped set the stage for the recent Great 
Recession. 
 
Part I 
 
In November, Nitzan presented his and Bichler’s ‘systemic fear’ thesis – including the 
correlation data that supposedly supports it – in a presentation to a joint session of the 
prestigious Harvard Law School and Harvard’s equally prestigious Kennedy School of 
Government. And a different version of the same argument, featuring the same correlation 
data, appeared earlier in an article they published in Dollars & Sense, a left-liberal economics 
magazine. 
But since their data actually show that equity prices and current profits were also strongly 
correlated from the early 1950s through 1973 – during the so-called golden age of capitalism! 
– we should doubt their claim that systemic fear has prevailed in recent years. After 
presenting and discussing these data, I will argue that flaws in B&N’s reasoning should also 
cause us to doubt their claim that capitalists are normally convinced that capitalism is eternal, 
as well as their claim that this conviction is crucial to its continued existence. But if the future 
of capitalism doesn’t hinge on the conviction that the system is eternal, it also doesn’t much 
matter whether capitalists have recently been gripped by systemic fear in B&N’s sense. 
Good old regular fear, ‘the dread and apprehension that regularly puncture [capitalists'] 
habitual greed’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2010, p. 18), is another matter. There can be little doubt 
that good old regular fear was intense at the start of the last decade, and even more intense at 
the end. I believe that this good old regular fear was justified and that it remains so. The 
underlying long-run economic problems that led to the recent Great Recession, and to the 
weakness of the subsequent recovery, have not been resolved. As I will discuss in Part II of 
this article, slow growth of employment relative to investment during the last six decades has 
led to a persistent fall in the rate of profit; the fall in the rate of profit has caused capital 
accumulation and economic growth to be sluggish for decades; and this sluggishness has led 
to mounting debt burdens. I doubt that the fall in the rate of profit can be reversed or that the 
debt problem can be solved without much more destruction of capital value – i.e. falling 
prices of real estate, securities, and means of production, as well as physical destruction – 
than has taken place to date. And if these problems remain unresolved, the economy will 
continue to be relatively stagnant and prone to crisis. 
But it is difficult to discuss these ideas with B&N, or at all, because they and others like 
them contend that the theory on which the ideas are based, Marx’s value theory, is internally 
inconsistent and circular. An internally inconsistent theory cannot possibly be correct.2 All 
ideas resting upon such a foundation can thus be disqualified at the starting gate, without 
further ado. In order to clear the ground for a genuine discussion – one in which B&N’s 
                                                 
2 An internally inconsistent theory may happen by accident to hit upon correct conclusions, but the argu-
ments it provides in support of these conclusions are always invalid. 
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approach to questions of crisis and the future of capitalism is compared with and contrasted 
to something rather than nothing – Parts II and II of this article will respond to the main 
criticisms of Marx’s value theory. 
 
* * * 
 
B&N (2010, p. 17, emphasis in original) note that ‘if we adhere to the scriptures of modern 
finance, we should expect to see no systematic association between equity prices and current 
profits.’ And they claim that equity prices have indeed become decoupled from current profits 
since 1917, except during two brief and exceptional periods. ‘Figure 2 and Table 2 show two 
clear exceptions to the rule: the first occurred during the 1930s, the second during the 2000s. 
In both periods … equity prices moved together – and tightly so – with current earnings’ 
(Bichler and Nitzan 2011, p. 17 emphasis altered). 
However, their Figure 2 actually shows four clear exceptions to the alleged rule. Equity 
prices also moved together with current earnings – and tightly so – from the early 1950s to the 
early 1960s, and from the early 1960s to the early 1970s (see my Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the first of these additional ‘exceptional’ periods, period 4 of Table 1, below, the 
correlation between equity prices and current earnings was stronger than during the Great 
Depression (period 2). During the other ‘exceptional’ period that B&N fail to bring to our 
attention, period 5, the correlation was lower, but still considerably stronger than during the 
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2000s (period 7).3 The percentage of the variation in one variable that is ‘explained’ by, or 
attributable to, the variation in the other is the square of the correlation coefficient, r2. Thus, 
as Table 1 shows, only about two-fifths of the variation in share prices during period 7 is 
attributable to variations in current profits; the explained variation during period 4 is almost 
twice as great, while the explained variation during period 5 is more than 50% greater.4  
. 
Table 1. Correlations between the annual rates of growth of stock prices and earnings per 
share, S&P 500 companies (monthly data are expressed as 3-year moving averages) 
 
 
Period 
 
no. of months 
 
correlation (r) 
share-price variation 
explained (r2) 
1 Oct. 1917 - Dec. 1929 146 0.29 8% 
2 Dec. 1929 - Feb. 1939 110 0.89 79% 
3 Feb. 1939 - June 1953 172 -0.34 12% 
4 June 1953 - Aug. 1962 110 0.90 81% 
5 Aug. 1962 - Dec. 1973 136 0.80 65% 
6 Dec. 1973 - Sept. 2000 321 -0.20 4% 
7 Sept. 2000 - Mar. 2010 114 0.65 42% 
strongly positive-correlation periods (2, 4, 5, and 7) 
42% of total months since Oct. 1917 
49% of total months since Dec. 1929 
.  
Table 1 also shows that share prices have been strongly and positively correlated with 
current profits more than 40% of the time since 1917, and almost half the time since 1929. So 
the ‘exceptions’ are not exceptional; the ‘rule’ that share prices and current profits have 
become decoupled is no rule at all. 
But B&N haven’t merely gotten their facts wrong. Because their facts are wrong, so is their 
paper’s key claim that we can infer that investors are gripped by ‘systemic fear’ when the relationship 
between current profits and equity prices is strong and positive. They tell us that the two periods in 
which systemic fear prevailed were two periods of acute crisis, the Great Depression and the 
2000s. If a strongly positive correlation between current profits and share prices were another 
exceptional feature of these periods of crisis, then the notion that we can infer the existence of 
systemic fear from the positive correlation might be plausible. But the 1930s and 2000s were 
not exceptional in that respect, as we have seen. And the other two strongly positive-
correlation periods, which run from the early 1950s through the early 1970s, cannot plausibly 
                                                 
3 The correlation was negative between February 1961 and May 1964. If we count this as a distinct pe-
riod and shorten periods 4 and 5 accordingly, the correlations during these periods increase to 0.92 and 
0.82. 
4 I computed a correlation of 0.65 for period 7, while B&N report a correlation of 0.64. My other results 
match theirs, so this slight discrepancy may be due to a recent revision of the data set, published by 
Robert Shiller on his website. 
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be characterized as a time of systemic fear. On the contrary, that era was the so-called golden 
age of capitalism.5 So a strongly positive correlation between current profits and equity prices 
does not allow us to infer the existence of systemic fear.  
But the correlation data are B&N’s only evidence that capitalists were gripped by systemic 
fear in the 1930s and 2000s. (The statements by the Financial Times, Alan Greenspan, Bernie 
Sucher, Gillian Tett, and Mervyn King quoted in their paper discuss a highly uncertain 
environment, economic crisis, and discredited economic theory and ideology, not fear of the 
death of capitalism.) So they have not given us a good reason to accept that claim. 
 
* * * 
 
Nor do they give us a good reason to accept that the opposite of systemic fear – the 
conviction that capitalism is eternal – is the norm. Their ‘demonstrat[ion]’ that capitalists are 
almost always guided by this conviction is fatally flawed. And since the same demonstration 
is the basis upon which B&N (2010, p. 3) claim that ‘[t]his … conviction is necessary for the 
existence of modern capitalism, at least in its present form,’ they also fail to give us a good 
reason to accept this latter claim. 
The most glaring flaw in their ‘demonstration’ comes at the end, when they write, ‘the fact 
that capitalists invest shows that they expect … that the value of their assets will grow, not contract – 
and that expectation means that, consciously or not, they also think that the ritual that 
valuates their assets will never end’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2010, pp. 3-4, emphasis added). The 
italicized clause is simply false. Just as some people buy lottery tickets even if they don’t 
expect to hit the jackpot, some people buy shares of stock even if they don’t expect their prices 
to rise. A large enough jackpot or a large enough potential capital gain more than makes up 
for a low probability of success. Hence, the fact that people invest does not mean that they 
normally expect capitalism to last forever.  
Imagine, for instance, that you think that there’s only a 50-50 chance that capitalism will 
exist a year from now, and that you are considering buying shares of stock for $10,000 today. 
If capitalism doesn’t survive, you’ll lose the whole $10,000, so it would be better to spend the 
$10,000 now, not invest it. You believe that this outcome is as likely as not, but you also 
believe that if capitalism does survive, the shares will be worth $500,000 a year from now. If 
you are like most people, you’ll go ahead and invest.  
Secondly, dozens upon dozens of experiments conducted by Nobel laureate Vernon 
Smith and colleagues (e.g. Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988; Porter and Smith 2003) 
during the past quarter century have demonstrated conclusively that people frequently invest 
in assets even when know that ‘capitalism’ (i.e., its experimental equivalent) will soon perish. 
Participants in the experiments are given some cash and some shares of an imaginary equity. 
They are told that the shares will pay dividends for a fixed length of time, such as fifteen 
                                                 
5 Since I, like B&N, computed the correlations between 3-year average values, periods 4 and 5 use data 
from August 1950 through December 1973, which is almost exactly coextensive with the golden age as 
defined by Skidelsky (2010, p. 24) the period ‘from 1951 to 1973.’ 
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periods, and that the experiment will then end, at which point the shares will be worthless. 
The current fundamental value of a share – the sum of the average per-period dividends 
throughout the remainder of the experiment – is announced at the start of each period.6 
Participants can buy additional shares from other participants, sell their shares, or hold onto 
them and collect their dividends. At the end of the experiment, they get to keep their initial 
cash endowments, dividends, and any net capital gains they have obtained. 
Now, B&N (2010, p. 3) claim to demonstrate that if capitalists believed that the system 
‘would cease to exist at some future point,’ then share prices ‘would have no-where to trend 
but down,’ and capitalists would therefore be unwilling to buy additional shares. But even 
though participants in the experiments are absolutely certain that the system (i.e., the 
experiment) will soon cease to exist and that the asset’s fundamental value is continually 
falling, share prices typically rise throughout much or most of the experiment – big bubbles 
are formed – and the volume of investment in additional shares is typically heavy. This has 
been the routine outcome even when the participants in the experiments are over-the-counter 
stock dealers, businesspeople, or students at the California Institute of Technology or the 
Wharton School. 
Research into why this ‘perverse’ behavior occurs is still ongoing, but the basic reason 
why people buy shares that eventually become worthless, and whose prices must therefore 
eventually fall, is obvious. People think that they may well make a substantial profit in the 
meantime, by reselling the shares at prices higher than those they paid.  
Finally, even if the rest of B&N’s ‘demonstration’ were sound, it would not prove that 
capitalists are normally guided by the conviction that capitalism is eternal. At least it 
wouldn’t prove this if we use the word ‘conviction’ in the normal way. B&N are undoubtedly 
aware that it would not, since they write that ‘consciously or not, [capitalists] also think that the 
ritual that valuates their assets will never end’ (emphasis added). I doubt that ‘unconscious 
conviction’ is a coherent concept, but even if it is, B&N’s appeal to it turns what started out as 
a provocative and straightforward claim into a piece of unfalsifiable Freudian speculation.7 
. 
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Systemic Crisis, Systemic Fear: A Rejoinder  
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, February 21, 2011  
 
Kliman’s paper isn’t exactly a critique. The author doesn’t engage our argument, and he 
shows no concern for the broader theoretical and historical context in which this argument is 
made. Instead, he looks for inconsistencies, discrepancies and incompatibilities – faults that 
in his view pull the rug out from under our entire analysis and make such engagement 
unnecessary to begin with. The gist of his complaint can be summarized as follows: 
  
1. Bichler and Nitzan, he argues, draw conclusions that their own data refute. They claim that in 
capitalism systemic fear is revealed solely by the breakdown of capitalization, with stock 
prices being positively and tightly correlated with current earnings; they then argue that 
such a breakdown occurred only during the 1930s and 2000s; and they use this 
observation to infer that during these periods capitalists have been gripped by systemic 
fear. However, according to the evidence that they themselves marshal, a positive and 
tight correlation also existed from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. And since the latter 
period wasn’t one of crisis – in fact, it is commonly seen as the ‘golden age’ of capitalism 
– the notion that we can use price-earnings correlations as indicative of systemic fear 
breaks down.  
 
2. Bichler and Nitzan erroneously assume that capitalism requires capitalists to believe that the system 
will continue forever. The error here is both logical and empirical. Simple probability theory 
suggests that, for a high enough reward, most people will invest even when they believe 
that the capitalist system is very likely to collapse. And laboratory experiments, including 
those reported by Nobel laureates, show that people will continue to buy stocks that they 
know will become worthless by the end of the experiment. In other words, capitalists act 
like capitalists regardless of what they think about the future of capitalism. 
 
3. The very notion of systemic fear is entirely subjective and therefore useless for a scientific inquiry. 
Nitzan and Bichler pretend to show that capital is a historical subject capable of bringing 
capitalism down, but their alleged demonstration relies on incoherent terminology and 
unfalsifiable Freudian speculations. Instead, they should go back to the ‘good old fear’ 
that capitalists feel when struck by a real crisis of real profit (as Marx already and perfectly 
explains in Das Kapital). 
 
The Sleepwalkers 
 
Kliman’s first point is correct, and we are grateful to him for having pointed it out to us. The 
positive correlation between share prices and current earnings indeed is not unique to the 1930s 
and 2000s. As he indicates, a similar correlation exists from the early 1950s to the early 1970s – a 
correlation that we overlooked and failed to mention in our paper. However, as this rejoinder 
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shall show, the oversight is hardly critical. It can be easily corrected in a manner consistent 
with both our systemic-fear hypothesis and our broader notion of the capitalist mode of 
power. 
To begin with, Kliman’s personal anxieties notwithstanding, inconsistency need not be 
lethal. Note that we are dealing here not with the heteronomous, irrefutable dogma of a 
frozen academic church, but with the autonomous, living process of an ever-changing 
science.1 And scientific discovery, unlike religious reiteration of eternal truths, is littered with 
oversights and errors. They are the bread and butter of the creative process, the serendipitous 
leeway that gives scientists the ability to tease order out of chaos. For academics concerned 
with the health of their career, errors are a recipe for disaster, a risk best avoided by limiting 
oneself to ‘adoptions’, ‘interpretations’ and ‘critiques’. But for creative scientists, making 
errors – and negating them – is the only path to breakthroughs. 
The Pythagoreans erred in their belief that every magnitude can be expressed as a 
rational number. This erroneous conviction, though, helped launch the remarkable triangle of 
democracy-science-philosophy, and the eventual refutation of that conviction created a much 
larger mathematics that incorporated irrational as well as rational numbers. And the list 
continues. Kepler’s astronomical research was bogged down for a decade by his supposition 
that celestial orbits were circular rather than elliptical, but that mistake sharpened his inquiry 
and hardly invalidated his broader thesis. Delambre and Méchain’s mission to measure the 
standard meter was full of baffling inaccuracies, but those inaccuracies helped trigger the 
mathematical development of statistical estimates. Einstein’s belief in a stationary universe 
didn’t sit well with his relativity theory, creating an inconsistency that he solved by inventing 
a ‘cosmological constant’; later on, when he accepted that the universe was expanding, the 
inconsistency disappeared and the constant became unnecessary (erroneous?); and nowadays, 
talk of an accelerating universe may end up giving the constant yet another lease on life. The 
works of Gardiner Means on administered prices and on the separation of corporate control 
from ownership, although subject to intense empirical criticism, remain two of the most 
fruitful starting points in twentieth-century economics.2 Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s 
Last Theorem took seven years to produce, only to be found fatally flawed. But two years 
later, the error was corrected, the proof was accepted, and mathematics benefitted from novel 
hypotheses and new areas of inquiry that Wiles’ torturous journey helped open up. Yutaka 
Taniyama, one of the greatest sleepwalkers of modern mathematics, was described by his 
collaborator Guro Shimura as sloppy to the point of laziness: ‘He was gifted with the special 
                                                 
1 The difference between heteronomy and autonomy is articulated in the social and philosophical writ-
ings of Cornelius Castoriadis – see, for example, his Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (1991). 
2 Means’ claim that there were in fact two types of prices – administered prices as well as market prices 
– was brilliantly defended against empirical error charges levelled by Chicago School Nobel laureate 
George Stigler but eventually swept under the carpet by the economics profession. His empirical data on 
the separation of corporate control from ownership, on the other hand, were shown faulty by the rela-
tively unknown Marxist Maurice Zeitlin but continue to inform mainstream business studies. See Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means (1932), Gardinder Means (1935; 1972), George Stigler (1970; 1973) and 
Maurice Zeitlin (1974). 
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capability of making many mistakes, mostly in the right direction. I envied him for this and 
tried in vain to imitate him, but found it quite difficult to make good mistakes’. This 
willingness to go astray enabled Taniyama to come up with a most fantastic conjecture on the 
symmetry between modular forms and elliptical equations, a conjecture that opened up 
multiple new mathematical horizons well before it was finally proven.3  
We, too, sleepwalked. Our concern was systemic fear and systemic crisis, not ‘business as 
usual’. We wanted to understand what happens not when capitalists are sure of their rule, but 
when they lose their confidence. We wanted to know how they act not when capitalism 
seems certain, but when it is put into question. And so we overlooked what in retrospect 
seems obvious. 
 
The Broad Context: The Capitalist Mode of Power, Capitalization and the Stock Market 
 
Kliman clings to a technical oversight, presenting it as a ‘make-or-break’ error for our broader 
argument. But by ignoring the argument itself and the overall framework in which it is 
developed, he ends up with a misleading caricature. 
So let us reiterate the broad picture, if only in outline, and in the process try to clarify our 
argument and put things right. Our focus on the twin notion of systemic fear and systemic 
crisis didn’t come out of the blue. It emerged as part of a new approach to capitalism – an 
approach that offers an alternative to both neoclassical and Marxian political economies and 
that we have articulated in many articles and books, including our recent Capital as Power 
(Nitzan and Bichler 2009a). In 2008, we began to write a paper series on the contours of 
crisis, a series that we hope to continue and eventually develop into a book (Bichler and 
Nitzan 2008, 2009; Nitzan and Bichler 2009b). The article ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance 
and the Future of Capitalism‘ (Bichler and Nitzan 2010) is an expanded version of the third 
installment in that series. The series introduces and develops the notions of systemic crisis 
and systemic fear – but it does so in steps, gradually rearticulating and refining the terms as 
the story continues to unfold.  
Mainstream and Marxist political economies see capitalism as a mode of production 
and/or consumption. Consequently, they both adhere to a double separation – one between 
politics and economics; and another between the so-called real and nominal spheres of the 
economy itself. In this framework, the nominal sphere of money, credit and finance is merely 
a mirror – accurate for the neoclassicists, distortive for the Marxists – of the underlying 
‘economic reality’. From this viewpoint, the only true crises are ‘real’ ones: crises of 
employment, production and consumption; crises of real profitability; crises of real 
accumulation, crisis of real investment, etc. These crises can be trigged by many causes, 
                                                 
3 One of the first, and still unparalleled, histories of cosmology is Arthur Koestler’s The Sleepwalkers 
(1959), a story that is nicely complemented by Simon Singh’s more recent Big Bang (2004). On the 
measurement of the standard meter, see Alder’s The Measure of All Things (2002). The development of 
mathematics is told in Singh’s Fermat’s Last Theorem (1997). Shimura’s quote on Taniyama is taken from 
this book. 
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including government intervention, natural disaster, war, and, of course, finance. But 
whatever their origins, they become meaningful only insofar as they materialize in the 
underlying ‘reality’ of the economy. 
Our framework is very different. Capitalism is not a mode of production and 
consumption, but a mode of power. To understand it, we start not from the narrow ‘material’ 
sphere of economics, but from the broad architecture of social power. And even when we 
deal with so-called economic processes, we focus not on productivity and well-being, but on 
the power to control productivity and well-being. In this framework, capital is not a 
technological/productive entity that is merely ‘reflected’ in finance. It is not machines, 
structures and work in progess, but a pure quantitative code of power. And that code is 
financial and only financial.  
The central and by now all-pervasive algorithm of the capitalist mode of power is 
capitalization: the discounting to present value of risk-adjusted expected future income. This 
is the ritual that constantly creorders – or creates the order – of capitalism’s power institutions 
and process. Over the past century, capitalization has expanded to encompass numerous 
aspects of social life – from the mindset and genetic code of individuals, to social 
organizations and institutions, to the ecological future of humanity. But the most distilled and 
perfected form of capitalization was and remains the stock market. This is the chief symbolic 
barometer of the capitalist outlook; it is the mechanism through which capitalists increasingly 
organize their world of strategic sabotage and differential accumulation; and it is the main 
yardstick with which they gauge their success and failure. 
 
Major Bear Markets 
 
Systemic crisis is one that threatens the very future of capitalism. The first necessary feature 
of such a crisis is the existence of a major bear market. That was the starting point of our paper 
series. In ‘Contours of Crisis: Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2008), we 
explained what we mean by such crises, identified their occurrence in the United States, 
characterized their features and speculated about their relationship to broad societal 
transformations.  
Since there is no agreed-upon definition for a bear market – let alone a ‘major’ one – we 
devised our own:  
 
A major bear market denotes a multi-year period during which: (1) the 10-year centred moving 
average of stock prices, expressed in constant dollars, trends downward; and (2) each successive 
sub-peak of the underlying price series, expressed in constant dollars, is lower than the previous 
one.4 
 
                                                 
4 This definition is more precise than the one in Bichler and Nitzan (2008). In the original article, we 
referred to a downtrend in stock prices. Here we operationalize this downtrend as a falling 10-year cen-
tred moving average.  
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Figure 1 
U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas indicate major bear markets, as defined in the 
text and in Table 1. The U.S. stock price index splices the 
following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and 
railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-
1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); 
the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-
present). The constant dollar series is computed by dividing the 
stock price index by the Consumer Price Index. The last data 
point is for 2010. Data are rebased with 1929=100.0 
  
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for stock 
prices; CPUSA for consumer prices); Standard and Poor’s 
through Global Insight (series codes: SP500@40.D7 and 
SP500.D7 for stock prices); IMF through Global Insight (series 
code: L64@C111 for consumer prices). 
 
 
The reason for expressing stock prices in ‘constant dollars’ is that the capitalist outlook is 
always differential. Modern capitalists do not seek simply to increase their dollar assets, but 
to increase them faster than the assets of others. Now, one of the most basic benchmarks for such 
comparisons is the standard basket of consumer goods and services. If the price of equities 
rises faster than the price of that basket, equity price inflation ends up being higher than 
overall CPI inflation; the so-called ‘constant dollar’ price of equities increases; and equity 
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owners end up doing better than the average basket owner.5 (Of course, beating CPI inflation 
is merely the first step in a long sequence, whose ultimate achievement is beating the increase 
of every existing basket, but these further steps should not concern us here.) 
According the above definition, over the past two centuries, the United States has 
experienced six major bear markets. These periods are marked by the grey areas in Figure 1 
and are listed in Table 1, along with the cumulative declines in stock prices. 
 
 
Table 1 
Major U.S. Bear Markets* 
(constant-dollar calculations) 
PERIOD 
DECLINE FROM PEAK  
TO TROUGH (%) ** 
1835–1842 –50% 
1851–1857 –62% 
1906–1920 –70% 
1929–1948 –56% 
1969–1981 –55% 
2000–2010   –50% 
 
  
NOTE: The most recent sub-trough of the cur-
rent major bear market occurred in 2008. It is 
not yet clear whether this sub-trough marks the 
end of this bear market. 
 
* A major bear market is defined as a multi-
year period during which: (1) the 10-year cen-
tred moving average of stock prices, expressed 
in constant dollars, trends downward; and (2) 
each successive sub-peak of the underlying 
price series, expressed in constant dollars, is 
lower than the previous one.  
 
** The peak occurs one year prior to the onset 
of a major bear market. 
 
 
Clearly, the 1950s and 1960s did not fulfill this first criterion of a systemic crisis: there 
was no bear market, let alone a major one. Although much of the emphasis during that 
                                                 
5 The measurement of ‘constant dollars’ involves significant theoretical and philosophical quandaries 
that economists are yet to solve. Our concern here, though, is not the logical underpinnings of the 
measurement, but the mindset of capitalists. And since capitalists take constant-dollar measures for 
granted, these difficulties need not detract us (for more on these issues, see Nitzan 1992: Chs. 5 and 7).  
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period, epitomized in the triumphalist books of John Kenneth Galbraith (1958; 1967), was on 
the rising welfare-warfare state, the self-financing ability of the leading industrial corporations 
and the alleged demise of finance, the stock market actually boomed – and at growth rates 
that would make today’s neoliberals envious. Capitalism was not in crisis, and capitalists 
certainly had no reason to fear for its future. That is obvious enough. 
 
Major Bear Markets and Societal Transformations 
 
Now, ‘Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?’ wasn’t merely technical. It further argued that the 
long-term ups and downs of the stock market, no matter how stylized and patterned, are not 
self-generating. They don’t just happen on their own. Each of them has a reason, and that 
reason is deeply social and historically unique. Note that, during the twentieth century, every 
oscillation from a major bear market to a bull market was accompanied by a systemic societal 
transformation: 
 
 The crisis of 1906–1920 marked the closing of the American Frontier, the shift from 
robber-baron capitalism to large-scale business enterprise and the beginning of 
synchronized finance.  
 
 The crisis of 1929–1948 signaled the end of ‘unregulated’ capitalism and the emergence 
of large governments and the welfare-warfare state. 
 
 The crisis of 1969–1981 marked the closing of the Keynesian era, the resumption of 
worldwide capital flows and the onset of neoliberal globalization. 
 
Moreover, the article pointed out that none of these transformations were ‘in the cards’. 
Most observers in the 1900s didn’t expect managerial capitalism to take hold; few in the 
1920s anticipated the welfare-warfare state; and not too many in the 1960s predicted 
neoliberal regulation. All three transformations involved a complex set of conflicts, their 
trajectories were fuzzy, and their outcomes were all but impossible to anticipate. 
In other words, underneath the seemingly oscillating long-term patterns of the market lies 
an open-ended and inherently unpredictable creordering of the entire political economy. 
Although past bear markets have always given way to long bull runs, these transitions were 
never automatic. Each and every one of them reflected a profound transformation of the 
underlying societal structure. This quantitative-qualitative correspondence, we noted, still 
holds. In order for the current crisis to end and a new long-term upswing to begin, the social 
structure must be transformed, and the key aspect of that transformation is the creordering of 
capitalist power. 
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The Capitalist Mode of Power: Hitting the Glass Ceiling 
 
While systemic crisis is always accompanied by a major bear market transformation, the 
reverse is not necessarily true: a major bear market does not have to be associated with 
systemic crisis. Systemic crises are ones that threaten the very future of capitalism, and these 
threats arise only when capitalist power hits a glass ceiling and it becomes difficult if not 
impossible for capitalist power to increase under existing circumstances. These conditions are 
fairly rare, and they need not exist – and usually do not exist – in every major bear market. 
How do we know that capitalist power is approaching its glass ceiling? The answer 
begins with the nature of capitalist power. Private ownership is created, augmented and 
protected through organized exclusion, and organized exclusion is always a matter of power: 
it requires strategic sabotage and the threat and occasional use of force. Now, capitalism is 
historically unique in that everything that can be owned can be priced. And since ownership 
is based on power, relative prices quantify the relative power of owners: the greater the 
relative magnitude of the owned assets, the greater the power of their owner. In this sense, 
capitalism is deeply differential, and that differentiality is not static, but dynamic. Caught in a 
never-ending power struggle, capitalists are compelled to think of accumulation not 
absolutely, but relatively. They seek not to meet the average, but to beat it; not to keep their 
distributive share, but to raise it; not to run with the herd, but to butt ahead of it. 
As we indicated in ‘Systemic Fear’, though, power is deeply dialectical. As an institution 
of power, private ownership is inherently conflictual: it requires organized exclusion, strategic 
sabotage and the differential exercise of force. And since capitalists are conditioned to 
accumulate differentially, their quest for further redistribution forces them to exclude more, 
inflict greater sabotage and increase the dose of force. But there is a built-in limit: no single 
capitalist or group of capitalists can ever own more than what there is to own. So from a 
certain point onward, further forceful redistribution is bound to run into mounting resistance; 
it gradually grows more difficult to achieve; and, eventually, it reaches its own envelope and 
becomes impossible to sustain. 
This is the glass ceiling, the point of hubris to which we alluded in ‘Systemic Fear’. It is 
the societal point where the rulers, having reached their maximum power, seem completely 
confident in the obedience of the ruled. And it is the point from where their power and 
confidence has no where to go but down.  
Have U.S. capitalists reached this point of hubris? In the second part of ‘Systemic Fear’, 
we noted that much of the postwar increase in stock prices was accounted for by the self-
reinforcing convergence of redistributional power processes. During that period, there was a 
rise in the gross profit and interest share of capitalists in national income; a drop in corporate 
taxation; a decline of profit volatility that reduced risk perceptions; and, since the early 1980s, 
a fall in the rate of interest that boosted corporate profit relative to interest payments and 
lowered the discount rate. Now, since these processes are self-exhaustive, the question is: at 
what point do they become impossible to maintain, and how far is the U.S. political economy 
from reaching that point?  
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One way to address this question is to examine the size distribution of income. This 
measure is far from ideal. Limited to income size, it says nothing explicit about the 
distribution between capitalists and non-capitalists (although it is reasonable to assume that 
much of the top income is earned by capitalists); it ignores the differential processes of 
accumulation that affect the distribution of income and assets within capital; and it tell us little 
about the non-income power underpinnings of capitalization.6 But the size distributional 
measure has one major advantage: thanks to the painstaking work of a few researchers, its 
data are available for an extended period, from 1917 to 2008. 
Such data are presented in Figure 2. The thin line shows the per cent share of ‘market 
income’, inclusive of capital gains, accounted for by the top 10% of the U.S. population. The 
thick line expresses the 5-year moving average of the underlying series.  
The numbers draw a striking U-pattern, with its twin peaks marked by the 1930s on the 
left and the 2000s on the right. In both periods, the income share of the top 10% of the 
population averaged over 45% and at some point approached 50%. And both periods are 
unique. In between, from the early 1940s to the early 1980s, the numbers are far lower, 
averaging less than 35% and hardly changing from year to year.  
Although there is no way to know for sure, it seems that 45% is fairly close to the glass 
ceiling for this measure. The bull market of the 1980s and 1990s was associated with a rise of 
more than 40% in the top’s income share (from 33% to 47%, and to nearly 50% more 
recently). Everything else remaining the same, a similar bull run from here onward would 
require the top income share to rise to 70%. Such an increase is highly improbable – that is, 
unless the U.S. turns into a dictatorship of the kind described in Jack London’s Iron Heel 
(1907) or Vladimir Sorokin’s Day of the Oprichnik (2011). And given that in the 1930s the top 
income share peaked at around current levels, it seems reasonable to take 45% as the cutoff 
point beyond which the ruling class enters hubris territory: confident in its enormous power, 
but aware that this power cannot increase much further.7 
So now we have two criteria for systemic crisis: (1) a major bear market; and (2) extreme 
income and asset inequality, indicative of peak capitalist power and an inability to increase 
that power significantly. It is at this point, when these two conditions of systemic crisis are 
fulfilled, that systemic fear – fear for the very future of capitalism – becomes possible. And 
according to the available data, these two conditions have only coincided twice since the First 
World War: during the the late 1920s and 1930s, and again during the 2000s. 
 
                                                 
6 On the differential ratio of net profit to wages, see Bichler and Nitzan’s ‘Elementary Particles of the 
Capitalist Mode of Power’ (2006: Figure 5). On capital’s share of national income, aggregate concentra-
tion and differential accumulation, see Nitzan and Bichler’s Capital as Power (2009a: Figure 13.1, p. 274, 
Figure 14.1, p. 318 and Figure 14.2, p. 320). 
7 Elsewhere in our work we examined the differential process by which capitalist power breaks through 
its geographic-societal ‘envelopes’ – from the industry, to the sector, to the national setting, and, finally, 
to the global arena (see, for example, Nitzan 2001; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Ch. 15) . In this process, 
the power of capitalists that are based in one region or country could expand by creating, altering and 
taking over capitalist power in other regions and countries. U.S.-based capitalists have done so after the 
1930s, but a repeat of that process nowadays seems less likely. 
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Figure 2 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Income is defined as ‘market income’, including capital 
gains; it excludes government transfers. Grey areas indicate 
periods during which the 5-year moving average of the data series 
exceeded 45%. The last data point is for 2008. 
  
SOURCE: Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2004. Income 
Inequality in the United States, 1913-2002. Monograph, pp. 1-92. 
Updated till 2008 from 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2008.xls; data sheet: 
data-Figure1 (retrieved on February 7, 2011).  
 
  
The Dominant Dogma and Forward-Looking Capitalization 
 
Now, note that these two conditions imply a potential for systemic fear. To know whether 
capitalists have actually been struck by such fear, we need a third condition. And that third 
condition is the breakdown of forward-looking capitalization.  
In our ‘Systemic Fear’, we argued that, under the normal circumstances of ‘business as 
usual’, capitalists are conditioned by their dominant dogma to follow the ritual of 
capitalization; that, in following this ritual, they express their belief that their system is 
eternal; and that this belief in turn implies that they are confident in their rule and in the 
obedience of the ruled (we deal with Kliman’s objection to this point later in the article). 
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However, in times of systemic crisis – i.e., when capitalism is mired in a major bear 
market, and when extreme inequalities, having pushed capital toward its envelope, make 
further increases in power difficult if not impossible to achieve – there arises the prospect of 
systemic fear. If that fear takes hold, with capitalists no longer certain of the future of their 
system, their ability to look forward is seriously impaired. And when looking into the future 
becomes impossible, the ritual of forward-looking finance breaks down.  
One indication of such a breakdown, we argued in our paper, is a tight, positive 
correlation between the rates of change of stock prices and current earnings. When capitalists 
adhere to the capitalization ritual, they price stocks based on the earnings trend all the way to 
the deep future (from the ‘standpoint of eternity’, as finance guru Benjamin Graham put it). 
But when capitalists are struck by systemic fear, the ritual breaks down, by definition. With 
the future of capitalism deeply uncertain, the long-term earnings trend becomes undefined, 
and undefined earnings cannot be incorporated into the capitalization formula. So capitalists 
have to look for an alternative. They need something they are sure of and which is visible 
here and now. And that something, we argued, is current earnings.  
Now note the causal direction here: systemic fear creates a tight positive correlation 
between the growth rates of equity prices and current earnings. But the reverse isn’t 
necessarily true: in and of itself, a positive correlation between the growth rates of equity prices 
and current earnings does not necessarily mean that capitalists have been struck by systemic 
fear.  
This point wasn’t properly articulated in our paper, so it is important to clarify it. To 
reiterate, according to the forward-looking capitalization formula, equity prices discount the 
long-term earnings trend. Current earnings do not appear in the capitalization formula, so in 
principle they should have no direct impact on share prices.8 However, current earnings can 
still have an indirect, apparent effect. During certain periods, one or more of the 
capitalization components can become correlated with current earnings, and if that happens, 
we may end up with a spurious correlation. For instance, changes in current earnings could 
be – and sometimes are – correlated negatively with changes in the rate of interest. And since 
the rate of interest features in capitalization, the result could be a spurious correlation 
between the growth rates of current earnings and stock prices. Indeed, there is nothing to 
prevent such a spurious correlation from cropping up during periods of systemic fear; and if it 
does crop up, the impact of current earnings on equity prices may become more difficult to 
disentangle.9  
                                                 
8 Current earnings feature in capitalization only insofar as they alter the long-term earnings trend. In the 
case of corporate equities, this impact is negligible and can be ignored.  
9 For example, during much of the period from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, the rates of change of 
equity prices and the rate of interest were negatively correlated (with interest rates measured by the tax-
free yield on AAA municipal bonds). This negative association means that, during that period, the ob-
served correlation between the rates of change of equity prices and current profits identified by Kliman 
may have been spurious. The same cannot be said about the 2000s, since the rates-of-change correlation 
between equity prices and the rate of interest during that period was positive. The case of the 1930s is 
more ambiguous. There was a negative correlation between the rates of change of prices and the rate of 
interest, but the variations of the rate of interest were very small relative to the variations in current 
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For this reason, the correlation between the growth rates of stock prices and current 
earnings becomes meaningful only in times of systemic crisis. It is only then, when capitalism 
is pulled down by a major bear market and capitalists are approaching their hubris point of 
peak power, that such a correlation could be taken as indicative of systemic fear. 
Figure 3 shows the levels and rates of change of equity prices and earnings per share 
(with rates of change expressed as 3-year moving averages). The grey areas indicate periods of 
high positive correlation between the rate-of-growth series at the bottom of the figures 
(including the period pointed out by Kliman). The correlation coefficients for the different 
periods are listed in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 
S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the 
Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share 
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving averages) 
 
 
PERIOD 
CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT 
   Jan 1873 – Oct 1917 + 0.72 
   Oct 1917 – Mar 2010 + 0.35  
Oct 1917 – Dec 1929 + 0.29 
Dec 1929 – Feb 1939 + 0.89 
Feb 1939 – Jun 1953 – 0.34 
Jun 1953 – Aug 1962 + 0.90 
Aug 1962 – Dec 1973 + 0.80 
Dec 1973 – Sep 2000 – 0.20 
Su
b 
pe
rio
ds
 
Sep 2000 – Mar 2010 + 0.65 
 
 
SOURCE: Figure 3. 
                                                                                                                                     
earnings, suggesting that their impact on prices was probably far smaller than the impact of current 
earnings. 
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Figure 3 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871-2011 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(left)
(3-year moving average, right)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in 
the previous twelve months. Monthly earnings are interpolated 
from annual data before 1926 and from quarterly data after 1926. 
Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. Both 
series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 
1929=100. The last data points are June 2010 for earnings per share 
and January 2011 for price.  
  
SOURCE: Robert Shiller 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, retrieved on 
February 7, 2011).  
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Table 3 
Criteria for Systemic Crises in the United States 
 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas denote periods of (1) major bear markets; (2) 
peaks of capitalist power as indicated by extreme income inequal-
ity; and (3) periods of a high positive correlation between the 
growth rates of share prices and earnings per share. The dashed 
lines delineate the two periods that fulfill all three criteria: 1929–
1939 and 2000–2010. 
  
SOURCE: Figures 1, 2 and 3.  
 
 
The data show four periods of high positive correlation: the period till 1917; the 1930s; 
the early 1950s to the early 1970s; and, finally, the 2000s. But based on our earlier discussion, 
only two of these periods can be associated with systemic fear. This association is 
summarized in the timeline of Table 3, which provide data on our three criteria for systemic 
fear. The table covers the period from the 1820s to the present, although the data coverage is 
uneven and allows conclusions to be drawn only from 1917 onwards.  
 
 The first criterion is a major bear market, based on the long-term trend and pattern of the 
stock market expressed in ‘constant dollars’. Based on these considerations, the United 
States has experienced six major bear markets since the 1820s.  
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 The second criterion is peak capitalist power, based on extreme income inequality. This 
condition has been fulfilled twice since 1917: from 1927 to 1940 and from 2000 to 2008 
(with the stock market having recovered since 2008, it is not far fetched to assume that 
income inequality continues to hover at peak levels). Combining these two conditions, 
we can conclude that only two of the four major bear markets since the beginning of the 
twentieth century have contained a systemic crisis: the periods from 1929 to 1940 and the 
period from 2000 to 2010. 
 
 The criterion for systemic fear is systemic crisis during which the rates of change of stock 
prices and current earnings are tightly and positively correlated. Such positive correlation 
existed during four periods since the 1890s. But only two of these periods were ones of 
systemic crisis: 1929-1939 and 2000-2010.10  
 
In sum. Kliman found an oversight in our paper on ‘Systemic Fear’ and celebrated it as if 
it pulled the rug out from under our entire argument. But that oversight, although 
inconvenient and regrettable, hardly dents our broad argument. Capitalism remains the first 
mode of power to offer a quantitative indicator for systemic fear. This indicator involves the 
convergence of three conditions that we have discussed at great length in our work: a major 
bear market, a glass ceiling of peak capitalist power, and the breakdown of the dominant 
dogma of forwarding-looking finance. And these conditions have coincided only in the two 
periods indicated in ‘Systemic Fear’ – the 1930s and the 2000s. 
 
Toward Behavioural Marxism? 
 
But Kliman is non-relenting. The problem, he claims, is not only empirical; it’s also 
theoretical. Think of a situation, he says, in which ‘you’ (the investor?) believe that capitalism 
is about to collapse, but you are not entirely sure (the probability of collapse is less than 100 
per cent). Next, assume that someone comes along and offers you to make a small investment 
that will yield an extremely high rate of return. If capitalism collapses, you lose your 
investment (no pain, no gain); but if it doesn’t, you become fabulously rich (fulfilling your 
mission on earth). Now, between you and me (wink), wouldn’t you grab this golden 
opportunity and invest? And given that you will go ahead and invest (assuming you are like 
most people – i.e. most capitalists), isn’t your decision a clear proof that the future of 
capitalism is irrelevant for capitalists (like you)? 
And if the logic of greed isn’t enough, there are the scientific experiments. According to 
Kliman, these experiments repeatedly show that ‘people’ (‘capitalists?) continue to invest in 
stocks, almost to the very end. They invest when earnings go up; they invest when earnings 
come down; in fact, they invest even when they know, with certainty, that earnings will 
                                                 
10 Although it is probably too early to tell, the 2010 data in Figure 3 suggest that the correlation between 
the rates of change of stock prices and current earnings is no longer positive. A continuation of this 
situation would mean that capitalists no longer suffer from systemic fear.  
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converge to zero and that the equities they buy will become worthless at a definite point in 
time. And since these experiments show that the investment behaviour of people (capitalists?) 
is more or less independent of the future of their system (i.e., the end of the experiment), the 
very notion of ‘systemic fear’ – at least in the way that Bichler and Nitzan describe it – is 
irrelevant and in fact meaningless. 
These are very interesting claims, particularly when coming from a fundamentalist 
Marxist. 
Marxism correctly rejects the neoclassical dogma. The neoclassical tenets – egocentrism, 
the emphasis on individual rationality, the belief that the market is natural, the sanctification 
of private property and the rejection of societal planning, to name a few – are deemed by 
Marxists to be historically false, logically invalid and morally objectionable. According to 
Marxist epistemology, the autonomous, utility-maximizing individual is an oxymoron, an 
impossibility that can be concocted only by the misguided ideological servants of capital. 
From the viewpoint of Marxists, human beings are not stand-alone entities, but creatures of 
their society. They do have a certain freedom to think and act. But in the final analysis, their 
thoughts and actions are bounded by the class relations and forces of production of their own 
historical epoch. 
Adhering to this epistemology, though, has proven easier said than done. Although 
critical of the liberals, Marxists have by and large failed to develop their own accounting 
system, their own unique data and their own dedicated research methods. And so, gradually, 
pressed by academic necessity and tempted by the available alternative, they have gravitated 
toward the ever-expanding databases and increasingly sophisticated methods of their class 
enemy, the bourgeoisie. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Marxists started to use the capitalist national accounts and 
measurements of the ‘capital stocks’. But there was a hefty price to pay: the derivation of 
these quantities relies on the very assumptions that Marxists correctly reject. ‘Real GDP’, for 
instance, is aggregated based on the supposition that the statistician knows equilibrium prices, 
and that these equilibrium prices reflect the relative utilities of the produced goods and 
services. Similarly with the ‘capital stock’: its magnitude, which many Marxists cite without a 
second thought, is taken to measure the util-generating capacity of the underlying machines 
and structures. And so, paradoxically, when Marxists routinely employ such measures to 
denote economic growth rates or the pace of capital accumulation, they end up endorsing the 
conceptual tools with which the ruling capitalist class manages society, as well as the 
individualistic-hedonic-equilibrium ideology that this ruling class imposes.11  
And that is just for starters. In subsequent decades, many Marxists began using bourgeois 
econometrics, and in so doing abandoned the last vestige of dialectics. They developed closed 
models with mathematical propositions and proofs, and in so doing made their arguments 
increasingly ahistorical. They succumbed to the elegance of game theory, and in so doing 
accepted the rational-atomistic starting point of conventional economics (and indirectly also 
                                                 
11 For more on the individualistic-hedonic-equilibrium assumptions of ‘real’ economic measurements, 
see for example Nitzan (1989) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Chs. 5 and 8). 
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the realism of international relations). And now we learn from Kliman that it is perfectly fine 
for a Marxist to invoke the findings of experimental economics and behavioural finance.  
Now, as noted, our own work starts from finance. This choice has nothing do with 
convenience or fashion. We start from finance because finance is the heart and brain of the 
modern capitalist mode of power. The capitalization ritual of finance is the algorithm with which 
capitalists creorder their society, and the relative magnitudes that emerge from that ritual map 
the ever-changing terrain of capitalized power. Deciphering modern finance is the initial step 
for any understanding of how modern capitalist power is organized, imposed and altered. 
Kliman, though, lives in a totally different world. According to the Victorian scriptures 
he adheres to, the only real capital is means of production denominated in socially necessary 
abstract labour time. The rest – i.e., finance – is a speculative fiction that sometimes matches, 
sometimes mismatches the movement of actual capital. And whatever has to do with 
speculations, bubbles and other mismatches and distortions can be safely delegated to the 
neoclassical experiments of Noble laureates and the psychological analysis of behavioural 
finance.  
But then, if this is the micro-Marxism Kliman has to offer, it is a strange one indeed: a 
representative experiment of representative gamblers, sans quotes, who serve to represent the 
universal human bourse, with no classes, no struggle, no dialectics, for ever and ever.  
Note that the participants in Kliman’s experiments are not capitalists, but ‘people’ (in 
America everyone has an equal opportunity to buy up Microsoft or sleep under the bridge). 
These people are examined not in a real, power-based society, but in a laboratory ‘game’ for 
which they are hired or volunteer (since, at the moment, the experiment is still too 
complicated for rats). There is no ruling class, no power belt and no underlying population of 
workers, unemployed and the redundant. There is only a collection of Marshallian 
‘representatives’. These ideal types play their game not in order to control their society and 
shape their world, but simply to make a buck (the universal drive of all people at all times, 
even if the buck happens to be hypothetical). And most importantly, the questions they face 
have no bearing on their own future, let alone on the future of their society. Once the 
experiment is over (capitalism ends) they can go home and forget all about it.  
The ultimate purpose of these experiments is to discover, once and for all, the eternal 
human ‘nature’ of the universal investor – and in the process annul the very heart of 
Marxism. According to Alan Greenspan (2008), this human nature can be conventional, or 
perverse. What matters, he explains, is ‘not whether human response is rational or irrational, 
only that it is observable and systematic’. And perhaps Kliman feels that, as a Marxist, he 
should endorse these natural-state-of-things models that the capitalist rulers impose on 
themselves and on their subjects.  
What remains unclear, though, is how any of this relates to the long-term outlook of the 
capitalist ruling class. To use simulated stock market experiments to tell us about the systemic 
confidence and fear of present-day capitalists is like using a chess game to understand the 
mindset of the French nobility during the French Revolution, or a board game of Monopoly 
to understand the anxiety of capitalists during the 1930s.  
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In our paper, we claimed that capitalist belief in the permanence of capitalization is a 
prerequisite for investment. This is a foundational claim. It deals not with this or that profit 
flow, with this or that asset, or with this or that capitalist. Instead, it refers to the basic 
institution of the capitalist mode of power: the institution that makes finance in general and 
capitalist calculations in particular possible to begin with, the institution that pervades 
everything capitalists do, the institution that holds their power structure together. The validity 
of our claim is tied to the centrality of this institution, and that is why we expressed our claim 
hypothetically, as a thought experiment. This is also why we brought different historical 
examples of systemic collapse – from the fall of the last Babylonian emperor Belshazzar, to 
the French Revolution, to the collapse of the Soviet Union – instances during which a 
latent but deep crisis suddenly gave way to disintegration. The crises themselves had 
different causes; but what made them culmiate in collapse, we argued, was that the rulers 
were struck by systemic fear: they lost their confidence in their own dogma and their ability to 
rule. And that loss – as well as its consequences – are difficult if not impossible to predict.  
‘[T]he future comes disguised’, says Coetzee; ‘if it came naked, we would be petrified by 
what we saw’ (1990: 163). To ask what will happen to capitalism if capitalists become 
convinced that capitalization is about to end is like asking what will happen to the ecosystem 
if the earth surface temperature rises by 25 per cent. No laboratory, even one run by a Nobel 
laureate, can replicate this process.  
 
The Capitalist Subject 
 
Finally, Kliman invokes the ‘S’-word: Bicher and Nitzan have turned capital into a ‘Subject’, 
capable of triggering its own demise, and they have voiced this claim using tongue-twisting 
concepts and irrefutable Freudian conjectures.  
We prefer to remain silent on the second allegation. The interested reader can judge for 
herself by reading our articles and books. But we have to plead guilty to the first accusation. 
Capital is certainly a subject, and with a capital ‘S’ to boot. In fact, if we are to remain true to 
Marx, we should add that, save for rare revolutionary situations, capital is the only social 
subject, the entity that subjugates all else – capitalists as well as workers -- to its will and rage.  
 
Marxists Contra Marx 
 
Kliman seems to have been deeply offended by our position ‘versus Marx’, as he puts it, so a 
few closing comments about this subject may be in order.  
We have the greatest admiration for Marx as a revolutionary scientist, and we have 
learned a great deal from his path-breaking work on the capitalist system. But like Marx (and 
unlike many Marxists), our real interest is not Marx, it’s capitalism. 
Marx tried to trace the intricacies of human history, map its progressive breakthroughs 
and understand its regressive setbacks. He focused on the critical aspects of the capitalist 
regime, searching for weak points in the fortified walls that protected the capitalist rulers. He 
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tried to anticipate the development of capitalism, the inner contradictions that would pave the 
way for a revolution.  
But Marx’s work mirrored his own epoch. And as capitalism continued to develop and 
mutate, his theories, research and conclusions became less and less congruent with the ever-
changing reality. As a result, radicals faced two mutually exclusive options. In the words of 
Cornelius Castoriadis, they had to decide whether to remain revolutionaries or ‘Marxists’. To 
choose the former meant to take from Marx what seemed true, insightful and useful – and to 
let go of the rest. To choose the latter meant to sanctify all of Marx’s writings and then 
constantly ‘reinterpret’ them to fit the shifting reality. 
Some radicals chose the former path, but many more took the latter. After Marx’s death, 
there emerged numerous congregations and sects, each with its own theological 
interpretation. Until the 1960s and 1970s, the fault lines were largely geopolitical. The main 
debate was between Moscow and Beijing, with subsidiary interpretations emerging later on in 
lesser communist capitals, such Belgrade, Havana and Pyongyang.  
The unravelling of Stalinism and Maoism and the winding down of the Cold War shifted 
the centre of gravity to the universities of Europe and North America. But that shift hasn’t 
liberated the Marxists from Marx. Instead of an open-ended scientific debate on the changing 
nature of capitalism, there developed a theological debate about the eternal nature of Marx’s 
writings (what Marx really meant). There are of course numerous exceptions, some of which 
are ingenious; but for many Marxists the key question has become how to appropriate the 
prophet’s writing and what should be done to fortify the faith.  
The consequence is a minute division of labour, not unlike the neoclassical one, between 
different groups of Marxists and post-Marxists, each specializing in protecting a different 
section of the Great Marxist Wall. There are experts on the ‘young Marx’, on ‘Marxist 
philosophy’ and on ‘Marxist dialectics’. Some deal with the ‘Marxist theory of the state’, 
while others focus on ‘cultural Marxism’. There are pundits for ‘analytical Marxism’, 
‘Marxism and game theory’, and ‘Marxist anthropology’. There are even those who claim to 
do ‘political Marxism’ (suggesting that Marxism can also be a-political). Within ‘Marxian 
economics’ proper, there are those who do ‘crisis’, others who do ‘regulation and the social 
structures of accumulation’, and still others who do ‘investment and profit rates’. There is 
even a specialization in ‘fictitious capital’ and its various distortions. The list goes on. Of 
course, not all of these specialists are defensive of the dogma, but many are. 
 At the analytical heart of these specialized endeavours stand the experts on Marx’s 
labour theory of value and surplus value. Most Marxists are unfamiliar with the intricacies of 
this theory, and most ‘productive labourers’, however defined, would probably find it 
impossible to understand – that is, assuming they even tried. But this theory is the foundation 
stone of Marx’s science.12 It is the key to understanding capitalist exploitation, capitalist 
                                                 
12 Marx claimed his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it did something 
they couldn’t: it objectively derived the rate of profit from the material conditions of the labour process. 
Prices of production, writes Marx, ‘are conditioned on the existence of an average rate of profit’, which 
itself ‘must be deduced out of the values of commodities. . . . Without such a deduction, an average rate of 
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development, and, eventually, capitalism’s own demise. It has to be defended, if only in 
appearance.  
This is the forte of Andrew Kliman. His own section in the Great Marxist Wall is the 
theory’s internal ‘consistency’. This section has been somewhat weakened since Bortkiewicz, 
but not to worry. A new and improved reading of the theory – the Temporal Single System 
Interpretation, or TSSI – has recently been applied to the weak points, and it works wonders. 
The method uses the fail-proof technique of revelation. The first conscientious application of 
this method is Thomas Aquinas’, whose starting point was the postulate that Jehovah-God 
‘revealed’ himself to his prophet (or his messengers). The neoclassicists apply the very same 
method to their claim that utility (preferences) is revealed by price. And now it’s Kliman’s 
turn: Marx wrote somewhere that value is revealed by price (or vice versa), and Kliman 
insists that reiterating this claim not only renders it true, but also cures Marxism of many of 
the chronic illness that have weakened it for years.  
For defenders such as Kliman, the key thing is to keep the dialectical faith unchallenged 
and the revolutionary laity free from heretical thoughts. Our 2009 Capital as Power contains a 
systematic critique of liberal and Marxist theories of capital and the elementary particles of 
utils and abstract labour on which these theories rest; it develops an alternative approach to 
capital based on power; and it offers an analytical, historical and empirical exposition of a 
new theory of differential accumulation and a new history of the capitalist mode of power. In 
short, it is an important book to ignore – and, indeed, so far no Marxist has reviewed it. Note 
that even Kliman, who apparently lost his nerve and broke the wall of silence, promises in his 
introduction not to deal with our own theory, but to defend his defence of Marx’s value 
theory – a defence that we dealt with only briefly in our book.  
Sadly, the zeal to defend Marx has caused many of the defenders to lose their grip on 
reality. The period since 2000 has seen capitalism rocked by major turbulence, and the free-
market dogma has been challenged openly from within and without. Liberal economics – 
including its macro and micro variants, its Keynesian and Monetarist inflections, its 
expectations and game theories – seems to have lost its intellectual compass, and there have 
been open calls on Nobel laureates to return their Sveriges Riksbank Prizes. This has been the 
historical opportunity Marxists have been waiting for since the 1930s, and they seem to have 
missed it. Instead of developing new theories and new research programmes, they were busy 
defending Marx and ridiculing or simply ignoring radicals who tried to transcend him. And 
when the time finally came, they were caught off guard. Marxists today talk of the falling 
tendency of the rate of profit and speculative-fictitious bubbles, of a too-weak or a too-strong 
state, of capitalist irrantionality, greed and corruption. But deep down inside, many of them 
                                                                                                                                     
profit (and consequently a price of production of commodities), remains a vague and senseless concep-
tion’ (Marx 1909, , Vol. 3: 185-86, emphasis added). This same point is reiterated by Engels: ‘These two 
great discoveries, the materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist produc-
tion through surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science. The next 
thing was to work out all its details and relations’ (Engels 1966: Section I, emphases added). 
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know that these reiterations belong to the world of yesterday. They offer no serious challenge, 
let alone an alternative, to the current capitalist mode of power.  
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